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The publication of this collection of essays coincides with the marked interest, in recent 
years, in Brentano’s philosophy, so that, as Tim Crane pointed out in his introduction to 
the recent reedition of the English translation of Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical 
Standpoint, Brentano’s work is presently “more scrutinized and debated than it has been 
for at least a hundred years.”2 This recent interest in Brentano’s philosophy is not merely 
circumstantial: it is mainly due, beyond the many events that have been organized as part 
of the centenary of his passing, to the originality and the actuality of his thought in light of 
the recent debates in philosophy. Indeed, besides Crane, there are quite a few philosophers 
who have recently contributed to the re-actualization of Brentano’s philosophy. This 
becomes quite manifest in the domain of philosophy of mind3 in which Uriah Kriegel, for 
example, has been advocating, for some years a neo-Brentanian philosophical program in 
addition to having significantly contributed to the recent reception of Brentano.4 This 
interest in Brentano’s work has given rise over the past five years to a great deal of original 
contributions to different aspects of Brentano’s philosophy, as much in the field of the 
history of philosophy as in those of ontology and metaphysics5, for example. 
One of the themes in which Brentano’s ideas are most discussed today is that of the nature 
of mental phenomena in relation to the notion of intentionality that Brentano has the merit 
                                               
1 Thanks to Friedrich Stadler et Guillaume Fréchette for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this 
introduction.  
2 T. Crane, Foreword to F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, London, Routledge, 2015, 
p. VIII. J. Benoist speaks of a “recent resurrection” of Brentano and rightly insists on the immense debt of 
Husserl to his master Brentano (in C.-E. Niveleau (dir.) Vers une philosophie scientifique. Le programme de 
Brentano, préface de J. Benoist, Paris, Demopolis, 2014, p. 13. 
3 See B. G. Tassone From Psychology to Phenomenology: Franz Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical 
Standpoint and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
4 See among other works U. Kriegel Brentano’s Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2018; U. Kriegel (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano 
School, Routledge, 2017; the special issue on Brentano’s centennial in The Monist (2017) on the occasion of 
the publication of this journal’s hundredth volume. Two further philosophical journals devoted a special issue 
to Brentano’s centenary: Brentano Studien, vol. 16, 2018; Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger, 
vol. 142, no. 4, 2017. 
5 Maria Luisa Lamberto, Deskriptive Metaphysik: Die Frage nach Gott bei Franz Brentano, Würzburger 
Studien zur Fundamentaltheologie, Frankfurt, Peter Lang, 2015; see also the papers collected in I. Tanasescu 
(ed.) Franz Brentano’s Metaphysics and Psychology, Bucharest, Zeta books, 2012. 
of having reintroduced into the vocabulary of our discipline, and which the papers 
reproduced in the first section, and, indirectly, most of the essays that we publish in this 
volume, address. Today, the horizon of the debates on intentionality has changed somewhat 
since the late 1950s, when Quine was engaged with R. Chisholm in a controversy over the 
necessity of the intentional idiom in philosophy or else, in Chisholm’s correspondence with 
Wilfrid Sellars, on the linguistic or non-linguistic character of the intentional. The overall 
interest in this issue considerably changed since then, even if Chisholm’s interpretation, 
which is still associated today with what is commonly called “Brentano’s thesis,” remains 
at the heart of many debates on the true meaning of Brentano’s view on intentionality.6 
One of these debates concerns whether Chisholm, in agreement with the understanding of 
intentionality by the majority of Brentano’s students, is right to attribute to Brentano, in 
addition to the psychological thesis (the aboutness of mental phenomena), the so-called 
ontological thesis (intentional in-existence as an entity endowed with a peculiar form of 
existence) in his interpretation of the meaning of intentionality in Brentano’s Psychology 
from an Empirical Standpoint, in particular.7 
But beyond this exegetical debate, Brentano’s thesis remains a lively alternative in recent 
philosophy, particularly in relation to the theme of consciousness, which has been, for some 
years now, the privileged research subject of many contemporary philosophers. One of the 
interesting debates is that surrounding the relationship between consciousness and 
intentionality. This debate has been the subject of many recent discussions among 
Brentano’s commentators, along with several other related issues, such as, for example, the 
unity of consciousness, which is also central to Brentano and his students8. This issue is 
closely related to the one regarding the nature of consciousness in Brentano and to his 
                                               
6 Cf. D. Fisette & G. Fréchette (eds.) Themes from Brentano, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2013, Section II: 
“Varieties of intentionality”, p. 87-164; Brentano Studien, Special Issue on Brentano’s Concept of 
Intentionality. New Assessments, vol. 13, 2015. 
7 F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, transl. A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, and L. 
McAlister, London, Routledge, 1973. 
8 B. Dainton has recently published several papers on the unity of consciousness which are very instructive 
as to the relevance of Brentano’s work in light of current debates on the subject; see “Brentano on the Unity 
of Consciousness”, in U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School, 
London and New York: Routledge, 2017, p. 61-74 ; “Brentano on Phenomenal Unity and Consciousness”, 
Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger, vol. 142, no. 4, 2017, p. 513-528; “Unity, Synchrony, 
and Subjects”, in D. Bennett & C. H. Hill (eds.) Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness, 
Cambridge, MIT Press, 2014, p. 255-285.  
connection to “phenomenal consciousness” which is now considered, to use David 
Chalmers’ well-known expression, the “hard problem” in philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science. In fact, there are several theories of consciousness that more or less 
explicitly claim to be followers of Brentano. The two most influential are now well 
established in contemporary philosophy. The first is associated with Tim Crane9 and what 
he calls in his book Aspects of Psychologism “weak intentionalism,” which is also a version 
of “Brentano’s thesis” (intentionality as the mark of the mental), and according to which 
“the nature of a conscious mental state is determined by its intentionality.”10 Recently, U. 
Kriegel stressed the affinities between Brentano’s descriptive psychology and the 
phenomenal intentionality program, which can be summarized as “the intentionality a 
mental state exhibits purely in virtue of its phenomenal character.”11 This program is based 
on two main principles which are also attributed to Brentano: a) intentionality as the mark 
of the mental, and b) all mentality is conscious. Another alternative pertains to higher order 
theories (HOT) of consciousness12, a version of which has also been advocated by U. 
Kriegel under the name of self-representational theory of consciousness.13 All of these 
theories are corroborated to a certain extent by Brentano’s writings, and they all have the 
merit of showing the actual relevance of Brentano’s philosophy of mind. 
There are several other topics related to Brentano’s philosophy that are currently attracting 
a lot of attention, including that of values in relation to emotions and affective states. This 
topic has recently given rise to several original contributions, notably with respect to the 
relationship between Brentano’s conception of values and the contemporary theories called 
“fitting attitudes theories of value.” Several recent books examine this topic in depth in 
                                               
9 In fact, the first one goes back to the work of D. W. Smith (“The structure of (self-)consciousness”, Topoi, 
Vol.5, No. 2, 1986, p. 149-156.) and it was recently taken up by A. Thomasson (“After Brentano: A One-
Level Theory of Consciousness”, European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 8, 2000, p. 190-209) who advocates 
an adverbial theory of consciousness. 
10 Tim Crane Aspects of Psychologism, Harvard, Harvard University Press, 2014, p. 150. 
11 U. Kriegel (ed.) Phenomenal Intentionality, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 2; “Phenomenal 
intentionality: past and present, introductory”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Science, vol. 12, 2013, p. 
437-444. 
12 See the special issue of the Brazilian journal Argumentos on Brentano and higher order theories of 
consciousness, vol. 7, no, 3, 2015. 
13 See U. Kriegel Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2009; “Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument”, Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 1, 2003, p. 103-132; “Consciousness, Higher-Order Content, and the 
Individuation of Vehicles”, Synthese, vol. 134, no. 3, 2003, p. 477-504. 
Brentano’s philosophy.14 This theme has also given rise to original contributions, not only 
from philosophers belonging to the Geneva environment (K. Mulligan in particular, but 
also J. Deonna and F. Teroni15) but also from outsiders to Brentanian circles such as J. 
Olson16 and M. Montague17, for example, who take a fresh and informed look at Brentano’s 
contribution in this field of research.  
But all this recent interest in Brentano’s philosophy cannot develop as much as many would 
like because, contrary to the writings of several of his students, including Husserl’s, only a 
fraction of Brentano’s writings is currently accessible to Brentano’s actual and potential 
readers. And many of his writings that are accessible through the editions of O. Kraus, A. 
Kastil, and F. Mayer-Hillebrand present major problems because of the editorial policies 
that prevailed in their editions. This editorial work has to be done all over again because 
Brentano’s writings have been systematically manipulated in order to promote Brentano’s 
late philosophical views.18 Since 2008, the reedition of Brentano’s works published during 
his lifetime has been undertaken by Ontos Verlag (now de Gruyter),19 supplemented by 
original introductions. Needless to say, the publication of numerous manuscripts, 
dictations, seminars, lecture notes, or Brentano’s abundant correspondence would greatly 
contribute to enhancing the contemporary interest in Brentano’s work 20. 
                                               
14 Cf. U. Kriegel Brentano’s Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value, chapters 7-9, p. 187-281; M. Textor 
Brentano’s Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, chapters 9-11, p. 194-245; Fisette & Fréchette 
(eds.) Themes from Brentano, Section IV, p. 273-338. 
15 One of Mulligan’s last contributions is “Incorrect Emotions in Ancient, Austrian & Contemporary 
Philosophy”, Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger, 2017, vol. 142, no. 4, p. 491-512; J. Deonna 
and F. Teroni, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction, London, Routledge, 2012. 
16 J. Olson “Two Kinds of Ethical Intuitionism: Brentano’s and Reid’s”, The Monist, vol. 100, 2017, p. 106-
119; “Brentano’s Metaethics”, in Kriegel (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano 
School, p. 187-195. 
17 M. Montague “A Contemporary View of Brentano’s Theory of Emotion”, The Monist, vol. 100, 2017, p. 
64-87; “Brentano on Will and Emotion”, Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School 
p. 110-123; The Given, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016 (chapters 2 and 5 specifically on Brentano). 
18 Cf, Fisette & Fréchette (eds.) Themes from Brentano, Section V, p. 359-418. 
19 Brentano, Sämtliche veröffentlichte Schriften, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2008-2018. 
20 Note however the recent publication of his correspondence with Stumpf: Franz Brentano-Carl Stumpf: 
Briefwechsel 1867–1917, T. Binder (Hrgb.), Frankfurt, Peter Lang, 2014) and Brentano’s correspondence 
with G. Fechner: F. Brentano and G. T. Fechner, Briefwechsel über Psychophysik, 1874-1878, M. Antonelli 
(Hrgb.), Berlin, De Gruyter, 2015. These two documents are important both for biographical information on 
Brentano and philosophically as complements to his published works. For since Brentano did not publish 
much during his lifetime but has maintained a substantial correspondence philosophically speaking with his 
students and several other philosophers, it constitutes a significant source of information on Brentano’s 
philosophy. The correspondence with Stumpf, for example, contains in this edition Stumpf’s own letters, and 
it represents a particularly important source on exchanges that these two philosophers have had on several 
subjects. There are also several ongoing projects related to the publication of Brentano’s manuscripts, namely 
That said, Brentano’s philosophical program was the starting point for many of his 
students, who brought their original contributions, even if they sometimes significantly 
deviated from Brentano’s teaching.21 There is a sense in which Brentano’s program was 
sometimes developed and deepened in a much more systematic way by his successors, and 
that Brentano’s philosophy, to be a fundamental contribution in this respect, is not the only 
one and perhaps not the most elaborated given that Brentano published very little in his 
lifetime. Be that as it may, several writings from, and commentaries on, Brentano’s 
successors have been published recently that provide a fairly good idea of the breadth and 
quality of their contribution to this program. This is the case, for example, for the works of 
the young Husserl, which, although very critical of Brentano, nonetheless constitute a 
significant contribution to this program. Several articles in this volume deal with Husserl’s 
relation to Brentano’s philosophy and I shall later return to that topic. Let us mention 
Stumpf’s many writings which, thanks namely to the Stumpf Gesellschaft in Hamburg, 
have been reedited or translated into English.22 In addition to the many scientific studies 
on Anton Marty, Karl Bühler, and Alexius Meinong23, there is the recent publication of 
                                               
in the well-known collection Primary Sources in Phenomenology at Springer which G. Fréchette has recently 
resurrected. Finally, let us mention the recent publication of the French translation of many writings from 
Brentano: Essais et conférences. Sur l’histoire de la philosophie, vol. I, Paris, Vrin, 2018; Essais et 
conférences. La philosophie et ses ramifications, vol. II, Paris, Vrin (forthcoming) ; Psychologie descriptive, 
trans. A. Dewalque, Paris, Gallimard, 2017. 
21 The term “philosophical program” is used here in a very broad sense to account for, on the one hand, 
Brentano’s plan to carry out his reform of philosophy from an empirical point of view, i.e., as a continuum 
with science, and on the other hand, the structural unity or architecture underlying Brentano’s philosophy as 
a whole. This problem has recently been raised by several Brentano’s commentators, namely by U. Kriegel 
“Brentano’s Philosophical Program”, in The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano 
School, p. 21-34; for a broader view on Brentano’s philosophical program, see D. Fisette, La philosophie de 
Franz Brentano, Paris, Vrin (forthcoming). 
22 C. Stumpf, Erkenntnislehre, 2nd ed., Lengerich, Pabst Science Publishers, 2011; Tone Psychology: Vol. I: 
The Sensation of Successive Single Tones, trans. R. Rollinger, London, Routledge (forth'coming); The 
Origins of Music, transl. D. Trippett, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012; D. Fisette, & R. Martinelli 
(eds.) Philosophy from an Empirical Standpoint: Essays on Carl Stumpf, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2015. 
23 G. Fréchette & H. Taieb (eds.) Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty, Berlin, De 
Gruyter, 2017; L. Cesalli & J. Friedrich (eds.) Anton Marty & Karl Bühler. Between Mind and Language, 
Basel, Schwabe, 2014; R. Rollinger, Philosophy of Language and Other Matters in the Work of Anton Marty: 
Analysis and Translations, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2010. On Bühler, see J. Friedrich (ed.) Karl Bühlers ‚Krise 
der Psychologie‘, Berlin, Springer, 2017.  
On Meinong, see D. Jacquette, Alexius Meinong. The Shepherd of Non-Being, Berlin, Springer, 2015; B. 
Leclercq, S. Richard et D. Seron (eds.), Objects and Pseudo-Objects. Ontological Deserts and Jungles from 
Brentano to Carnap, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2015. 
major works by the Polish philosopher Kazimierz Twardowski,24 as well as his 
correspondence with A. Meinong.25 This voluminous literature of the past five years on the 
philosophy of Brentano and his successors, including the essays we publish here, provides 
us with many arguments justifying the current interest in this segment of the history of 




SECTION I Descriptive psychology and phenomenology: Brentano and Husserl 
The first part of this collection of essays focuses on the relationship between Brentano’s 
descriptive psychology and phenomenology with a special focus on the relationship 
between Brentano and his student Husserl. The authors of the first three papers are 
recognized leading experts in Husserl’s philosophy, and they take a new look at the links 
between the father of phenomenology and his master Brentano. The first paper is authored 
by Dagfinn Føllesdal, a pioneer in the Husserlian studies since the publication of his careful 
study in the late 1950s on the relationship between Husserl and Frege.26 Føllesdal’s article 
“Brentano and Husserl on Intentionality” provides a series of insightful remarks regarding 
his interpretation of the notion of intentionality in Brentano and Husserl, and it includes an 
appendix containing a talk delivered in 1995 on Husserl’s theory of intentionality in light 
of Aristotle’s philosophy.  
His study begins with short remarks on Brentano’s Aristotelian and medieval background 
in philosophy and argues that Brentano’s early and late conception of intentionality is 
largely indebted to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. He then comments on Husserl’s 
alternative position and his own interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intentionality which 
has been wrongly dubbed “The Frege interpretation” because, according to Føllesdal, his 
                                               
24 K. Twardowski, Gesammelte deutsche Werke, A. Brozek & J. Jadacki & F. Stadler (eds.), Berlin, Springer, 
2016; On Prejudices, Judgments and Other Topics in Philosophy, A. Brozek & J. Jadacki (eds.), Amsterdam, 
Rodopi, 2015; Logik. Wiener Logikkolleg 1894/95, A. Betti & V. Raspa (eds.), Berlin, De Gruyter, 2016. 
25 A. Meinong & K. Twardowski, Der Briefwechsel, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2016. On Twardowski and Polish 
philosophy, see M. van der Schaar, Kazimierz Twardowski: A Grammar for Philosophy, Leiden, Brill, 2016; 
A. Brożek Kazimierz Twardowski. Die Wiener Jahre, Berlin, Springer, 2011; A. Brożek, Chybińska, J. 
Jadacki and J. Woleński (eds.), Tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School Ideas and Continuations, Leiden, Brill, 
2015. 
26 D. Føllesdal, Husserl und Frege: Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung der Entstehung der phänomenologishen 
Philosophie, Viv. Akad.Avh, Oslo, 1958. 
interpretation of Husserl’s notion of noema (intentional content) “is much closer to 
Bolzano”. Be that as it may, he also briefly discards a well-known objection to this 
interpretation based on the identification of the noema to an object. The next part is about 
Husserl’s interpretation of Brentano’s philosophy on a number of issues, namely on 
intentionality, and he then sketches the main points in his Husserl interpretation. Finally, 
in the appendix on Husserl and Aristotle, he criticizes two opposite interpretations of 
Aristotle’s theory of perception, more specifically on the relationship between the form 
and matter of sense-organ, and he asks whether it is merely a physiological process 
involved or whether it is not consciousness which is solely responsible for one becoming 
aware of the reception of sensible forms. Føllesdal criticizes R. Sorabji’s and M. 
Burnyeat’s opposite interpretation of Aristotle and adopts a third way that he associates 
with Husserl’s theory of perception according to which perception involves both awareness 
and physiology, and the form taken on by our sensory organ (Husserl’s noema) is 
considered an abstract intentional structure.  
D. W. Smith’s rich and complex paper “Descriptive Psychology and Phenomenology: 
From Brentano to Husserl to the Logic of Consciousness” focuses on Husserl’s theory of 
intentionality and he seeks to retrace the complex lineage from Brentano to Husserl’s 
phenomenology after the publication of Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic27 and onward 
into the reception of Husserl in contemporary philosophy of mind. He first briefly 
introduces Brentano’s philosophy of mind and then argues that the originality of the young 
Husserl’s theory of intentionality developed during this period essentially consists in 
joining together key elements from descriptive psychology and from logical theory, 
thereby taking an anti-psychologistic turn.28 In the second part, he traces the sources of 
Husserl’s phenomenology in Brentano’s descriptive psychology; he stresses once again 
Husserl’s contribution to phenomenology and the originality of his theory of intentionality, 
which lies, among other things, in the use of the ideal logical form and its integration in 
his theory of mind. The final result is Husserl’s “semantic” theory of intentionality. 
                                               
27 Husserl, Philosophy of Arithmetic. Psychological and Logical Investigations, Collected Works, vol. X, 
trans. D. Willard, Berlin, Springer, 2003. 
28 Cf. David Woodruff Smith, Husserl, 2nd ed., London, Routledge, 2013; H. Dreyfus (ed.), Husserl, 
Intentionality, and Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1982; D. W. Smith & R. McIntyre, Husserl 
and Intentionality. Dordrecht, Reidel, 1982. 
Woodruff Smith then addresses the issue of the modalities of consciousness, which is 
another important aspect of his interpretation of Husserl’s theory of consciousness, and it 
raises in turn the issue of the ontology of Husserl’s intentional content or the so-called 
noema. Woodruff Smith claims that Husserl was forming a “semantic” conception of the 
ideal content of intentional experience. However, he argues, on the other hand, that Husserl 
was not trying to “force” this conception into the intentional content, but rather believed 
that mathematical constructions in formal semantics were merely “an abstraction from the 
structure of lived conscious intentional experience.” The fifth part is a modal theory of 
Brentano’s intentional “in-existence,” which Smith explains in terms of an “intentional 
relation” to the intentional object “existing in a horizon of alternative possible situations or 
worlds” (also in terms of what Hintikka called the “intentionally possible”). In the sixth 
part, he sketches a modal theory of internal consciousness understood as a feature of the 
modality in which the mental state is actualized, and he concludes his study with some 
remarks on the issue of phenomenal consciousness in recent philosophy of mind29. 
In his contribution “Brentano’s Concept of Descriptive Psychology,” Dermot Moran 
adopts a quite different stance on the relationship between Husserl’s phenomenology and 
Brentano’s descriptive psychology. His paper begins with a preface on Brentano’s 
relationship with Cardinal John Henry Newman in 1872 during a short trip in Great Britain 
whose main goal was to meet John Stuart Mill, a meeting which unfortunately never took 
place. But the main topic of Moran’s paper is Brentano’s descriptive psychology, which he 
publicly introduced in his lectures on descriptive psychology delivered in Vienna between 
1887 and 1891.30 After a short presentation of Brentano’s distinction between descriptive 
and genetic psychology, Moran describes Husserl’s conception of descriptive psychology 
during the Halle period and Brentano’s strong influence on Husserl’s phenomenology, 
which is understood, in the Logical Investigations, as a descriptive psychology in 
Brentano’s sense. But Moran argues that Husserl was also very critical of Brentano’s 
                                               
29 Smith stresses the importance of the topic of qualia and the issue of phenomenal consciousness in 
philosophy of mind and he refers to the following recent studies which have drawn Brentanian and Husserlian 
views into these concerns: T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.) Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2011; U. Kriegel (ed.) Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013; 
see also D. W. Smith & A. Thomasson (eds.) Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2006. 
30 F. Brentano, Descriptive Psychology, trans. B. Müller, London, Routledge, 1995. 
philosophy as a letter he wrote on 18 June 1937 to Marvin Farber apparently testifies. In 
this letter, Husserl suggests that even if he saw in his own philosophy a contribution to 
Brentano’s program, he has always considered since the defense of his habilitation thesis, 
that his own way of thinking was quite different from Brentano’s. This is not the place to 
debate what Husserl meant by “way of thinking,” but there are quite a few testimonies and 
passages in his work in which Husserl clearly recognizes his immense debt to Brentano as 
shown by several essays that we publish in this book31. 
Moran then draws some parallels between Brentano’s distinction between descriptive and 
genetic psychology, Wilhem Dilthey’s distinction in “Ideas concerning a descriptive and 
analytic psychology”32 between explanatory and descriptive or analytical psychology, and 
Wundt’s distinction in the introduction to his Principles of Physiological Psychology33 
between physiological and descriptive psychology. The next three sections bear on several 
important issues in Brentano’s psychology, namely the methodological priority of the 
description over the explanation of mental phenomena, the nature of introspection or inner 
consciousness, and one of Brentano’s main principles in his Psychology, to which Husserl 
pays much attention in his Logical Investigations, and according to which “all mental 
phenomena are either presentations or based on presentations.”34 The next two sections are 
about Husserl’s self-criticism of his characterization of his early version of phenomenology 
in terms of descriptive psychology that Moran situates in 1902-1903, namely in Husserl’s 
lectures on epistemology.35 
The last paper of this section is authored by Guillaume Fréchette and it is mainly about an 
issue which has only been addressed superficially by the other articles in this section, 
namely the division within Brentano’s psychology between phenomenology, which is 
another name for Brentano’s descriptive psychology, and genetic psychology. Fréchette 
claims that the complementarity of both branches of psychology was central in Brentano’s 
                                               
31 In his recent book Husserl’s Legacy. Phenomenology, Metaphysics, & Transcendental Philosophy 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017), D. Zahavi quotes the same excerpt (p. 7-8) in order to discard 
Brentano’s contribution in the development of Husserl’s philosophy! 
32 In. W. Dilthey, Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding, trans. R. Zaner & K. Heiges, The 
Hague, Nijhoff, 1977, p. 21-120. 
33 W. Wundt Principles of Physiological Psychology, trans. E. B. Titchener, London, Swan Sonnenschein, 
1902. 
34 Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, p. 85. 
35 Husserl Allgemeine Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesung 1902/03, Husserliana Materialien, vol. III, E. 
Schuhmann (ed.), Berlin, Springer, 2001 
initial project of a philosophy as science and he argues that this distinction was already 
involved in Brentano’s early conception of psychology during the Würzburg period. He 
first emphasizes the importance, in Brentano’s project, of the first and fourth habilitation 
theses: the first thesis is based on a sharp division between speculative and exact sciences 
whereas the fourth prescribes the use in philosophy of the methods of the natural sciences. 
He then maintains that Brentano’s two theses constitute the basis of his program of a 
philosophy as science to the extent that Brentano’s psychology, for example, is a mixture 
of what Fréchette calls speculative exactness and empirical research.  
 
Section II : Brentano and the Vienna Circle 
The three papers of this section address several aspects of Brentano’s activity at the 
University of Vienna, the relationship that he and his successors in Austria have had with 
the Vienna Circle, and the place of Brentano’s program in the history of philosophy in 
Austria. Several studies on this topic have been dominated by the idea of a specific 
“Austrian philosophy” that goes back to Bernard Bolzano, and which later developed 
notably via Brentano and his students, to finally result in logical empiricism and the Vienna 
Circle. This idea was explicitly formulated for the first time in Otto Neurath’s seminal work 
on the historical development of the Vienna Circle, in which he advances the hypothesis 
that logical empiricism is the culmination of empiricist trends in the history of philosophy 
in Austria since Bolzano, and that Vienna’s intellectual environment (Umfeld) has set up 
the favorable conditions for the development of an empiricist attitude as taught radically 
by the Vienna Circle.36 This idea has been taken over and systematically developed by 
Rudolf Haller in several studies, notably in his classical article “Wittgenstein and Austrian 
Philosophy,” in which he defends what is now called the Neurath-Haller thesis according 
to which there exists since Bolzano an autonomous Austrian philosophy (as opposed to the 
German tradition) possessing an “intrinsic homogeneity” which is characterized among 
other things by its scientific Weltanschauung and its aversion to Kantianism and 
metaphysics.37 The next step was taken by Barry Smith in the 1990s in his influential book 
                                               
36 O. Neurath, Le développement du Cercle de Vienne et l’avenir de l’empirisme logique, Paris, Hermann, 
1935, p. 8. 
37 R. Haller, “Wittgenstein and Austrian Philosophy”, in K. Lehrer and J. C. Marek (eds.), Austrian 
Philosophy Past and Present, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1996, p. 1-20. 
Austrian Philosophy, in which he criticizes the alleged regionalist and ethnocentric 
connotations of the Neurath-Haller thesis, and emphasized the central place of Brentano 
and his successors in this tradition, thus relegating the logical positivism to merely “a part 
of the exact or analytic philosophical legacy of Brentano.”38 
No one doubts the major impact of Brentano’s philosophical program on the course of the 
history of philosophy in Austria, despite the fact that, after his resignation as professor in 
1880, Brentano had only the status of a Privatdozent in Vienna. However, by the time he 
definitively left Austria in 1895, most of the chairs of philosophy in the Habsburg Empire 
were occupied by his own students who, as we shall see, disseminated Brentano’s ideas 
inside and outside Austria. As for the link with the Vienna Circle, several recent studies, 
including those reproduced in this book and Uebel’s careful studies on Neurath and the 
prehistory of the Vienna Circle39, clearly show that the Austrian members of the Vienna 
Circle were acquainted with Brentano’s philosophy, namely through the discussions they 
had with many students of Brentano and Meinong who were active in Vienna at the time 
when Neurath, Frank, and Hahn made their first step in philosophy. This is partly 
confirmed by Neurath in the Vienna Circle manifesto (1929), of which he was the main 
author, and his pamphlet mentioned above where he mentions Brentano several times and 
stresses the orientation that Brentano and his students adopted toward experimental 
sciences and logical thinking40. Moreover, recent studies show that Brentano not only 
favored the positivist program as advocated by philosophers such as Auguste Comte and 
even Ernst Mach, for example, in whom Brentano saw the signs of an ascending phase of 
philosophy at the time, but in addition, his own program of philosophy as a science bore 
many traces of Comte’s positivism, for instance. It is true that Brentano is sometimes very 
critical of the main defenders of the positivist program, as shown by his lectures 
“Contemporary philosophical questions”41 which he held in Vienna one year before he left 
Austria, and in which he carefully examines several versions of positivism from Comte to 
                                               
38 B. Smith Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano, La Salle, Open Court, 1994, p. 29.  
39 See T. Uebel Vernunftkritik und Wissenschaft: Otto Neurath und der erste Wiener Kreis, Berlin, Springer, 
2000; “Otto Neurath, the Vienna Circle and the Austrian Tradition”, in A. O’Hear (ed.), German Philosophy 
since Kant, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 249-269;  
40 Neurath, Le développement du Cercle de Vienne et l’avenir de l’empirisme logique, p. 36, 38, 43. 
41 The manuscript of the 1893-1894 lectures ‘Zeitbewegende philosophische Fragen’ has not yet been 
published; it bears the signature LS 20 ; see also F. Brentano, Über Ernst Machs ‘Erkenntnis und Irrtum’, R. 
Chisholm & J. C. Marek (eds.), Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1988. 
Mach and Stuart Mill. It is also true that his orthodox students such as Kraus and Kastil 
created a gap between Brentano’s late philosophy and neo-positivism, as we shall see. But 
as far as Brentano is concerned, far from rejecting positivism out of hand, he remains close 
enough to Mach’s and Stuart Mill’s version of positivism, mainly methodologically, to 
propose different means to fill the gap between their respective philosophical positions. 
This fact is significant in the present context given that Mach has been a major source of 
inspiration for most members of the Vienna Circle42. 
The first contribution to this section is Hans-Joachim Dahms’ paper “Brentano’s 
appointment at the University of Vienna”, which is an original and well-documented study 
of Brentano’s intellectual biography in Vienna and also to the history of philosophy in 
Austria.43 It commences with the so-called Glaubenskrise in Brentano’s life during his last 
years in Würzburg and his criticism of the dogma of the Papal infallibility enacted by the 
Catholic Church during the First Vatican Council in July 1870. The second part deals with 
the situation of philosophy in Vienna before Brentano’s arrival, and the long and complex 
process that led to his appointment in 1874. In his article “My Last Wishes for Austria” 
written shortly before he left Austria in 1895, Brentano observed that, when he arrived in 
Vienna in 1874, there was indeed a Herbartian doctrine – he refers to Herbart’s two 
disciples in Vienna, Franz Karl Lott and Robert Zimmermann – but there was no school, 
and this nothingness was all what existed then in Vienna44. Dahms clearly explains how 
Brentano, thanks to the intervention of Hermann Lotze and the minister Karl von Stremayr, 
managed to obtain this chair in Vienna. He then turns to Brentano’s inaugural lecture in 
Vienna entitled “On the reasons of discouragement in philosophical domains,”45 in which 
Brentano outlines for the first time his program of a philosophy as science, and briefly 
describes the reception of Brentano’s teaching and activity in Vienna. One of the original 
aspects of Dahms’s paper lies in the discovery of Brentano’s several documents in which 
he outlines his program for the future of philosophy in Vienna. Some of these documents 
are not available anymore, but there is one piece entitled “The Needs of Philosophical 
                                               
42 F. Stadler Studien zum Wiener Kreis, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1997. 
43 See also H.-J. Dahms & F. Stadler “Die Philosophie an der Universität Wien von 1848 bis zur Gegenwart”, 
in K. Kniefacz, E. Nemeth, H. Posch, and F. Stadler (eds.) Universität – Forschung – Lehre. Themen und 
Perspektiven im langen 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen, Vienna University Press, 2015, p. 77-131. 
44 F. Brentano, Meine letzten Wünsche für Österreich, Stuttgart, Cotta,1895, p. 34. 
45 F. Brentano, Über die Gründe der Entmutigung auf philosophischem Gebiete, Wien, Braumüller, 1874. 
Studies at our University” that was sent to Stremayr’s successor, Paul Gautsch, in 1886, in 
which Brentano formulated some recommendations to the Minister for the purpose of 
attracting new young students and promoting the scientific and philosophical research in 
the faculty. To do this, Brentano recommends setting up a seminar and a laboratory of 
psychology which, however, he would never obtain, as Brentano will later explain in his 
article “My Last Wishes for Austria.” As Dahms points out at the end of his study, it is 
only in 1922 that a psychological chair and institute was established in Vienna, and 
ironically it was a sympathizer of Brentano’s philosophy, namely Karl Bühler, who 
inherited the responsibility of this institute46. 
In his challenging paper “Intentionality in the Vienna Circle,” Thomas Uebel is interested 
in the overall stance of the Vienna Circle members vis-à-vis Brentano’s notion of 
intentionality. He maintains that most of them agree with Brentano’s view on intentionality 
as the key concept in the domain of psychology, but unlike Brentano, they sought to 
naturalize intentionality through different means, namely via logical behaviorism. He 
begins with an exposition of the received view according to which logical positivist 
philosophy of mind aims for the dismissal of intentionality by different means. Moreover, 
he relies heavily on the work of D. Moran47 to criticize the standard view of Brentano’s 
thesis that I mentioned above. He claims, after Moran, that Brentano did not “argue that 
intentionality constituted a mark of the mental that distinguished mind as irreducible to 
body or that it was to be analyzed as a person’s relation to a proposition – nor was he, as 
others have argued, much concerned with the mind’s relation to non-existent objects.” This 
claim is certainly not unproblematic in light of what I said above, but Uebel’s interpretation 
of Brentano’s theory of intentionality along the lines of a relational approach is also 
advocated by several well-known interpreters of Brentano.48 Be that as it may, Uebel 
proposes to stick only to the psychological thesis and the directedness of mental 
                                               
46 See G. Benetka Zur Geschichte der Institutionalisierung der Psychologie in Österreich. Die Errichtung 
des Wiener Psychologischen Instituts, Wien, 1990, p. 148 f. 
47 D. Moran “Brentano’s thesis”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes,  
Vol. 70, 1996, p. 1-27. 
48 See the special issue on intentionality of the Brentano Studien (vol. 13, 2015) which opposes advocates of 
the orthodox interpretation of Brentano’s views on intentionality to the proponents of unorthodox and 
continuist interpretation. 
phenomena because it was from this angle that the members of the Vienna Circle 
understood Brentano’s intentionality thesis. 
Uebel’s paper is divided into five main parts. He begins with some observations on the 
relationship between the Austrian members of the so-called first Vienna Circle with 
Brentano’s students in Vienna. He first hypothesizes that the Meinong-Höfler logical 
textbook49, which was mandatory for young Austrian students at the time, probably 
constituted the first contact that O. Neurath, P. Frank, and H. Hahn had with the notion of 
intentionality. Another possible source considered by Uebel lies in their discussions with 
Brentano’s students in the Philosophical Society in which Neurath and Frank, for example, 
were very much involved. The situation is quite different for the non-Austrian members of 
the Vienna Circle, such as M. Schlick and R. Carnap, who, as we know, were very familiar 
with the work of Brentano and his students. He first examines M. Schlick and claims that 
despite his criticism of Brentano and his students, namely in his book Allgemeine 
Erkenntnislehre50, Schlick nonetheless endorsed Brentano’s intentionality thesis. He then 
addresses three aspects of Carnap’s position on intentional relations: first, in the Aufbau51; 
second, through Carnap’s logical behaviorism; and third, in connection with his conception 
of psychological terms in Meaning and Necessity,52 in which Carnap developed an 
intensional logic for the analysis of meaning. The last part of this study concerns Neurath’s 
position with regard to the intentionality thesis which, according to Uebel, while not a 
priori against the very idea of intentionality as the mark of the mental, seems to adopt a 
form of behaviorism. This is not very far from Quine’s behaviorism, which aims at 
eliminating the intentional and the mental altogether from philosophy. Uebel’s paper also 
contains an appendix on Carnap’s extensionality thesis.  
 
Damböck’s paper “(Dis-)Similarities: Remarks on ’Austrian’ and ’German’ Philosophy in 
the 19th century” raises a more general issue regarding the historiography of the history of 
philosophy in Austria and it bears on a subset of the Neurath-Haller thesis that I mentioned 
                                               
49 A. Höfler, Logik (unter Mitwirkung v. A. Meinong), Vienna, Tempsky, 1890.  
50 M. Schlick Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, Berlin: Springer, 1918, in particular §20 entitled “Die sogenannte 
innere Wahrnehmung” in which he examines the concepts of internal perception and evidence by Stumpf and 
Brentano. 
51 R. Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt, Berlin, Weltkreisverlag, 1928. 
52 R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1947. 
above, i.e., the position advocated by Barry Smith at the very beginning of his book 
Austrian Philosophy. Smith’s challenging position has been criticized over the years but 
Damböck is more interested in Smith’s series of features that he listed at the beginning of 
his book and through which he characterizes Austrian philosophy in the 19th  and 20th 
century. This series of features is also meant to dissociate the Austrian tradition from the 
history of philosophy in Germany, which has been dominated by Kantianism in all respects, 
from German Idealism to the different schools of Neo-Kantianism. Damböck argues that 
Smith’s features are somewhat too focused on the Bolzano-Brentano axis, and he proposes 
to purify it from its idiosyncratic elements. He then claims that this new abbreviated list 
satisfies Austrian philosophers, as well as many representatives of German philosophy, and 
Smith’s argument to the effect that his list is ultimately applicable only to Austrian 
philosophers is therefore false. 
Damböck’s analysis raises the question regarding the scope of this criticism on the 
Neurath-Haller thesis. This question arises all the more since Smith’s thesis on Brentano’s 
place in Austrian philosophy was initially intended, if not as a contribution to the Neurath-
Haller thesis, at least as an alternative.53 Smith himself challenged Haller’s criteria and 
argued that several other criteria can support this claim, including institutional criteria. The 
real issue then is whether there is a tradition that is typical of the history of philosophy in 
Austria and how it differs from the German tradition. Neurath’s main hypothesis, as I said, 
is that logical empiricism is the culmination of empiricist tendencies in the history of 
philosophy in Austrian since Bolzano, and these empiricist trends constitute in turn the 
conditions for the development of an empiricist stance of which the Vienna Circle is a 
radicalization54. I take it, on the one hand, that the core of Neurath’s understanding of this 
tradition and the common denominator of this typically Austrian tradition is empiricism in 
its different forms, and on the other hand, that Neurath’s position so understood is not 
essentially affected by the criticisms directed against the Neurath-Haller thesis. 
                                               
53 Smith seems to distance himself from this thesis in an article published two years after his book (“The 
Neurath-Haller thesis: Austria and the Rise of scientific Philosophy”, in K. Lehrer and J. C. Marek (eds.), 
Austrian Philosophy Past and Present, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1996, 1-20) in which he argues that the expression 
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54 O. Neurath, Le développement du Cercle de Vienne et l’avenir de l’empirisme logique, p. 8. 
 
Section III: Brentano and the history of philosophy 
The contributions in the third section are on the topic of Brentano and the history of 
philosophy in general. It includes four studies on different aspects of Brentano’s 
relationship with philosophers belonging to his vast network of interlocutors and 
acquaintances. These studies of Brentano’s historical work add to the many recent 
publications on Brentano’s main correspondents and interlocutors that have attracted a 
great deal of interest in recent years55. Several of these studies have focused on Brentano’s 
privileged relationship with British philosophers such as Alexander Bain, Thomas Reid, 
G. F. Stout, Edward B. Titchener, for example, or positivist philosophers such as Auguste 
Comte and Ernst Mach, for example, or with German philosophers such as Hermann R. 
Lotze, Wilhelm Wundt or Gustav Fechner. These studies provide us with a much better 
understanding of Brentano’s intellectual environment. Worth mentioning in this regard is 
the marked interest of the medievalists56 for different aspects of Brentano’s works on 
medieval and ancient philosophy. The four studies in this section examine three 
philosophers that Brentano knew well, namely, John Stuart Mill, Wilhelm Jerusalem, and 
Ernst von Lasaulx; the fourth study examines Brentano’s student Kazimierz Twardowski 
and his contribution to a renaissance of philosophy in Poland at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.  
In “Learning from Lasaulx: The Origins of Brentano’s Four Phases Theory,” Richard 
Schaefer questions the origins of Brentano’s philosophy of history based on his four phases 
theory.57 He focusses his attention on Lasaulx with whom the young Brentano studied 
between 1856 and 1857 and who, according to Stumpf in one his memoirs on Brentano, 
                                               
55 Cf. the last issue of Brentano Studien (vol. 16, 2018) on Brentano’s centennial; the proceedings to the 
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Philosophy after one Hundred Years – From History of Philosophy to Reism, Berlin, Springer, 2019; M. 
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Amsterdam, Brill, 2019.  
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Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty. 
57 F. Brentano, “The Four Phases of Philosophy and Its Current State,” in: B. Mezei and B. Smith (eds.) The 
Four Phases of Philosophy, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1998. 
would have exerted a lasting influence on our philosopher.58 This hypothesis is prima facie 
plausible even if, again according to Stumpf, it was only Easter of 1860 when Brentano 
reported having acquired the idea of the four phases “as a way to overcome his pessimism 
over the state of philosophy.”59 Nevertheless, Schaefer shows convincingly that many 
parallels can be drawn between the main principles of Lasaulx’s philosophy and Brentano’s 
program of a philosophy as science that I described above, and also in their approach to 
history. One of the interesting elements in light of Brentano’s early criticism of Comte’s 
three states theory is that Lasaulx, in his own philosophy of history, takes into account the 
negative moments in this historical process – namely, “decline and death” – and just like 
Comte and Brentano, he maintains that history is guided by laws. But what is more 
important, they both encourage the use of the inductive method in philosophy and they 
both share the overall project of philosophy as science.  
Anna Brożek’s study “Franz Brentano and Polish Philosophical Thought” is about the 
influence of Brentano’s philosophy on the Polish philosophical tradition from Kazimierz 
Twardowski to philosophers of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The first half of her paper is a 
general reflection on the very phenomenon of “influence” in the practice of the history of 
philosophy before tackling the Polish philosophical thought as such. She first looks at the 
source of Brentano’s ideas in Poland (i.e., mainly Twardowski’s work) and she examines 
the numerous aspects of Brentano’s philosophical program, from Brentano’s philosophy 
of history to his logic. She argues that it was through his student Twardowski that Brentano 
exerted his influence on Twardowski’s Polish students and some of the members of the 
logical branch of the Lvov-Warsaw School: J. Łukasiewicz, S. Leśniewski, and A. 
Tarski. She claims that Brentano’s philosophy also exerted a certain influence on Polish 
psychologists who have taken up typical Brentanian themes such as the distinction between 
descriptive and physiological psychology, the priority of the descriptive over the 
explanatory, the intentional character of mental phenomena and their classification in three 
classes, Brentano’s ontology, ethics, and philosophy of history. In her conclusion, she 
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59 C. Stumpf, “Reminiscences of Franz Brentano”, trans. L. McAlister, in L. McAlister (ed.) The Philosophy 
of Franz Brentano, London, Duckworth, 1976, p. 27. 
points out that several aspects of Brentano’s program are still alive in contemporary Polish 
philosophy60.  
In his paper “Brentano and Jerusalem on the Nature of Judgment”, Mark Textor carefully 
examines the difference between Jerusalem’s theory of judgment and Brentano’s. In the 
first part, he compares Brentano’s theory of judgment (based on the notion of psychological 
mode or attitude) with that of Mach, which he describes as a relational theory of judgment 
whose function consists in relating something to something else. The second part of his 
paper is meant to introduce W. Jerusalem’s theory of judgment in his “Anti-Brentano 
book”61 in which he sides with Mach against Brentano. In Die Urteilsfunktion, Jerusalem 
develops three arguments against Brentano’s view of judgement in terms of attitudes: the 
circularity argument, the linguistic articulation argument, and the argument from the 
judgment function, which Textor examines in the next three parts of his paper. He argues 
that Brentano can escape Jerusalem’s arguments.  
My own study, the last of this collection of essays, is entitled “Brentano and John Stuart 
Mill on Phenomenalism and Mental Monism” and I examine Brentano’s criticism of a 
version of phenomenalism that he calls “mental monism,” which he attributes to 
“positivist” philosophers such as Ernst Mach and John Stuart Mill, for example. I am 
mainly interested in Brentano’s criticism of Mill’s version of mental monism which is 
based on the idea of “permanent possibilities of sensation.” Brentano claims that this form 
of monism can be characterized by the identification of the class of physical phenomena 
with that of mental phenomena, and argues that it commits itself to a form of idealism. 




Kastil’s manuscripts in the appendix constitute a significant contribution to this book’s 
main topic, i.e., the relationship between Brentano’s philosophical program and the history 
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Continuations. 
61 W. Jerusalem Die Urteilsfunktion: eine psychologische und erkenntniskritische Untersuchung, Wien, 
Braumüller, 1895. 
of philosophy in Austria, in particular the philosophy of the Vienna Circle.62 Alfred Kastil 
was a student of Anton Marty in Prague and he is known, in the Brentanian circles, as the 
main editor, with Oskar Kraus, of the publication of Brentano’s writings as I mentioned 
above. He was also closely related to Brentano in the last years of his life as shown by his 
extensive correspondence with Brentano. He spent most of his career in Innsbruck, where 
he was professor from 1909 to 1934, and he then moved to Schönbühel near Melk in 
Austria, not too far from Vienna, where he lived in Brentano’s summer house thanks to 
Brentano’s son Giovanni, to whom Kastil had been the tutor several years before. At 
Schönbühel, Kastil’s main concern was to prepare the edition of Brentano’s writings for 
publication, but he also accepted, for two semesters, a lectureship at the University of 
Vienna, where he lectured on “Selected metaphysical questions” in the summer semester 
of 1937 and, in the winter semester of 1937-1938, he lectured on “The philosophy of Franz 
Brentano”63. Moreover, at the beginning of the 1930s, Kastil took up, together with Oskar 
Kraus, the scientific defense of Brentano’s late philosophy against Brentano’s unorthodox 
students and against neo-positivism or logical empiricism advocated by the members of 
the Vienna Circle64. Kastil undertook an all-out campaign against philosophers who did 
not comply with this version of Brentano’s late philosophy based on reism, including 
Stumpf65 and his student Husserl.66 
Worth mentioning in this context is Kastil’s Gastvorlesung that he read in Karl Bühler’s 
seminar in the summer semester of 1935 on Brentano’s conception of the relationship 
between psychology and philosophy.67 We know that Bühler obtained the chair of 
                                               
62 On Kastil’s life and work, see P. Goller, Die Lehrkanzeln für Philosophie an der philosophischen Fakultät 
der Universität Innsbruck (1848 bis 1945), Innsbruck, Kommissionsverlag der Wagner’schen 
Kommissionsbuchhandlung, 1989, p. 123-151. 
63 A. R. Wieser, Die Geschichte des Faches Philosophie an der Universität Wien 1848-1938, Dissertation in 
philosophy, Vienna, University of Vienna, 1950, p. 227. 
64 Kastil’s crusade against the so-called Brentano’s secessionist students had already begun in 1909, in his 
book Studien zur Erkenntnistheorie (vol. I: Descartes. Halle, M. Niemeyer, 1909), where he denounced the 
major modifications proposed by Brentano’s students Meinong, Höfler, and Twardowsky to the master’s 
conception of intentionality. 
65 In his article “Ein neuer Rettungsversuch der Evidenz der äußeren Wahrnehmung. Kritische Bemerkungen 
zu Stumpfs Erkenntnislehre” (Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, vol. 3, 1948, p. 198-218), Kastil 
again defends Brentano against Stumpf’s criticism of Brentano’s thesis of perception as judgment. 
66 See A. Kastil, „Brentano und der Psychologismus“ (Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, vol. 12, no. 
3, 1958, p. 351-359) in which he defends Brentano against Husserl’s objection of logical psychologism in 
his Prolegomena.  
67 Kastil’s short presentation in Bühler’s seminar is a sketch of Brentano’s philosophical program and a 
concise description of its two main branches, i.e., metaphysics and psychology, of the three main normative 
“Philosophy with special consideration for experimental psychology and pedagogy” at the 
University of Vienna in August 1922 and he began his teaching the same year as the 
Kantian Robert Reininger and as Moritz Schlick, who inherited Brentano’s chair occupied 
before him by Ernst Mach and partly Ludwig Boltzmann. There is a sense to say that, upon 
his arrival in Vienna, Bühler assumed Brentano’s legacy. For by obtaining a fully equipped 
experimental psychological research institute at the University of Vienna, Bühler 
succeeded where all of his predecessors in Vienna failed, starting with Brentano himself 
who, as I said above, left Vienna in 1895 namely because of the ministry’s refusal to grant 
him a laboratory of psychology. Although it was not Bühler but Schlick who inherited 
officially Brentano’s chair, the hiring of Bühler in Vienna was nevertheless intended to fill 
this gap as one can see in the ministry’s report dated from 1922: 
Since Brentano’s departure, the Faculty of philosophy in Vienna and its institute, 
which specializes itself in experimental psychological research, have been deprived 
of their representative in this field. We therefore very much welcome the news that 
Professor Bühler will obtain from the municipality of Vienna a prestigious research 
chair within the Faculty and a fully equipped experimental psychological research 
institute with assistants and an extensive library, which will be made available to 
him. Through the person of Bühler, this institute will maintain a close relationship 
with the Faculty of philosophy, which will be to the advantage of the research 
chair’s scientific activities.68 
But the linkage of Bühler to Brentano and the Austrian tradition in philosophy is not merely 
institutional. Indeed, in most of his published writings before his arrival in Vienna69, his 
main interlocutors were associated with the Austrian tradition and Brentano, whom Bühler 
called the “Spiritus Rector” of philosophical psychology of the old Austria.70 For example, 
the theoretical part of Bühler’s 1913 treatise on the perception of Gestalten focuses on the 
discussions triggered by Christian von Ehrenfels’s publication of his classic “On Gestalt 
                                               
sciences i.e., aesthetic, ethics, and logic, which are rooted in psychology, and of the distinction, within the 
latter, between descriptive and genetic psychology. He then raises the question of psychologism, which he 
understands in terms of the confusion between Sein and Sollen with respect to the relationship between 
philosophy and psychology, and he argues that Brentano saw in this objection a mere sobriquet unsuitable 
for serious philosophical discussion. He also examines a second objection pertaining to the manner in which 
anti-psychologists base their requirement of the a priori character of the concepts of metaphysics. The last 
part of his paper is a brief description of Brentano’s works. 
68 Quoted in G. Benetka, Zur Geschichte der Institutionalisierung der Psychologie in Österreich, Wien, 
Geyer, 1990, p. 179 (my translation). 
69 See especially K. Bühler, Die Gestaltwahrnehmung. Experimentelle Untersuchungen zur psychologischen 
und ästhetischen Analyse der Raum- und Zeitanschauung, vol. 1, Stuttgart, Spemann, 1913 ; Die 
Erscheinungsweisen der Farben, Iena, Fisher, 1922. 
70 K. Bühler, Das Gestaltprinzip im Leben des Menschen und der Tiere, Stuttgart, Hans Huber, 1960, p. 15. 
Qualities”71 and to which participated most of Brentano’s students, including Husserl and 
Stumpf72.  
Kastil’s two papers in the appendix are lectures delivered in the Philosophical Society at 
the University of Vienna. The first one is entitled “Is the distinction between whole and 
sum merely factual?”73 and it is a critical examination of Schlick’s article “On the concept 
of whole” (“Über den Begriff der Ganzheit“), which was also presented before the 
Philosophical Society on January 18, 1935.74 The basic manuscript for this publication 
entitled “Gestaltpsychologie” (1933/34) is also reproduced in the appendix. Schlick tackles 
the erroneous use of the term whole (Ganzheit) in both philosophy and science in order to 
show that the solutions generally proposed with this concept to several different problems 
ranging from the mind-body problem to the relationship between individuals and 
community are in fact only pseudo-solutions because the sentences containing the word 
“totality” do not have a clear and unequivocal meaning. The concept of whole, which he 
identifies to that of Gestalt in the Berlin school (he refers to W. Köhler) serves as a special 
case of a philosophical analysis that does not, as in science, bear on facts and it does not 
give either an immediate knowledge of reality, but merely an elucidation of the issue on 
the way we express the facts. And elucidation understood with this meaning is the 
prerequisite for being able to express the facts correctly. The concept of Gestalt as that of 
sum are two modes of description which do not refer to different objective properties of a 
given configuration, but they mean first and foremost different modes of presentation. 
Schlick argues indeed that between totality and sum there is no substantial difference but 
only “different ways of describing the same facts” (p. 015563) and that one is much more 
convenient or practical than the other one. Schlick claims that most pseudo-problems 
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Munich, Philosophia, 1929, p. 11–81. 
72 On the major influence of Stumpf’s program on Bühler’s thought, see D. Fisette “Phenomena and Mental 
Functions. Karl Bühler and Stumpf’s Program in Psychology”, Brentano Studien, vol. 14, 2016, p. 191-228. 
73 („Ist die Unterscheidung zwischen Ganzheit und Summe keine sachliche?“), reference? 
74 M. Schlick, “Über den Begriff der Ganzheit”, Wissenschaftlicher Jahresbericht der philosophischen 
Gesellschaft der Universität zu Wien, Wien, Verlag der philosophischen Gesellschaft der Universität zu 
Wien, 1933-1924 and 1934-1935, p. 23-37; also in M. Schlick Die Wiener Zeit. Aufsätze, Beiträge, 
Rezensionen 1926-1936, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung I, Band 6, J. Friedl & H. Rutte (eds.), New 
York, Springer, 2008, p. 681-700. 
 
(Scheinprobleme) in philosophy and science arise from the fact that one confuses questions 
of facts with issues belonging to descriptions and logical grammar.75 
Kastil’s second lecture was presented on November 13, 1936 under the title “Franz 
Brentanos Kritik der Antimetaphysiker” and it is a reflection on the state of philosophy in 
Vienna nearly fifty years after the establishment of the Philosophical Society. Kastil more 
specifically refers to philosophers who succeeded Brentano in Vienna and who were the 
main detractors of metaphysics, from Mach to the members of the Vienna Circle. 
 
                                               
75 On Schlick’s paper “Gestaltpsychologie”, see F. Stadler’s introduction in this volume to his edition of 
Schlick’s paper. 
